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School of Business, Adelphi University, Garden City, New York
We study network design in which each pair of nodes can
communicate via a direct link and the communication
flow can be delivered through any path in the network.
The cost of flow through each link is discounted if and
only if the amount of flow exceeds certain threshold.
This exploitation of economies of scale encourages the
concentration of flows and use of relatively small num-
ber of links. Applications include telecommunications,
airline traffic flow, and mail delivery networks. The
cost of services delivered through such a network is
distributed among its users who may be individuals or
organizations with possibly conflicting interests. The
cooperation between these users is essential for the
exploitation of economies of scale. Consequently, there
is a need to ensure a fair distribution of the cost of
providing the service among network users. In order to
describe this cost allocation problem we formulate the
associated cooperative game, to be referred to as the
threshold game. We then demonstrate that certain cost
allocation solution  the core of the threshold game can
be efficiently applied to relatively ’large’ networks with
threshold-based discounting.
Keywords: network design, cost allocation, cooperative
games, hub-like networks
1. Introduction
The motivation for this work came from the
studies of hub networks, which play an impor-
tant role inmodeling transportation and telecom-
munication systems. In hub communication
networks a certain subset of focal nodes  i.e.
hubs is fully interconnected, while other nodes
are connected to those hubs. Communication
between the nodes is done exclusively via hubs.
The assumption is that hub nodes are completely
interconnected, while non-hub nodes are con-
nected to one or more hubs. Moreover, the
cost of traffic between hubs is discounted. The
advantage of hub networks is the usage of rel-
atively small number of links and exploitation
of economies of scale by concentrating flows.
The hub networks were extensively studied over
the last couple of decades  see for example,
1,5,6,16 and 17. Numerous computa-
tional studies show that hub networks are quite
attractive and practical. Nevertheless, the re-
strictions imposed with the hub network model
are sometimes too prohibitive. For example, in
some cases, high traffic between a non-hub and
a hub node is not discounted andor the traffic
between two hubs is not big enough to warrant
any discounts. For an extensive discussion on
these issues see 7.
Recently, Podnar et al. 7 introduced the net-
work model in which each pair of nodes can
communicate via any path, and the cost of
sending flow through each link is discounted if
and only if the amount of flow exceeds certain
threshold. This approach also gives incentive
to concentrate flows. It seems however, that
the above threshold-based discounting model
is even more ’efficient’ than hub networks in
its use of a relatively small number of links
and in the exploitation of economies of scale.
We will refer to the threshold-based discount-
ing network model as to the hub-like network
 HLN model. Their paper provides combi-
natorial formulations and efficient heuristic for
finding the minimum cost HLN.
The cost of services delivered through a hub-
like network is distributed among its users who
may be individuals or organizations with pos-
sibly conflicting interests. The cooperation be-
tween these users is essential for the exploita-
tion of economies of scale. Consequently, there
is a need to ensure a fair distribution of the
cost of providing the service among users of a
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hub-like network. Failing to do so may cause
some users to secede and seek services from
some other, competing network. Such seces-
sion would inevitably result in a higher cost per
unit of delivered service.
A cooperative game theory was used to analyze
several classes of network cost allocation prob-
lems in the literature. Some examples include:
spanning tree games  4, Steiner tree games
 11, network flow games  2,3, cost allo-
cation arising from routing in networks  8,
capacitated network design games  10,15,
hub network games  12. For a survey and
numerous references on cost allocation mod-
els in networks see, 9. A common approach
to above papers is the formulation of the as-
sociated cost allocation problem as a cooper-
ative game in characteristic function form, fol-
lowed by the evaluation of various solution con-
cepts such as core, nucleolus, kernel, the least
 -core, Shapley value, etc. It is well known
that these game theoretic solution concepts are
computationally prohibitive even for relatively
small problems. Moreover, there are no gen-
eral practical algorithms for the computation of
these solutions. Consequently, researchers have
concentrated on individual classes of games to
demonstrate that computation of cost allocation
solution concepts is sometimes feasible in the
context of a particular problem.
The cost allocation problem associated with the
HLN was first introduced by D. Skorin-Kapov
13,14. Therein, the hub-like game which em-
phasizes the users’ contribution to economies
of scale was defined. In addition, the core of
the hub-like game was efficiently characterized
 by  O n4 constraints. This characterization
is associated with the tight 4-dimensional for-
mulation of the HLN model presented in 7.
Namely, the best known solution obtained by the
4-dimensional formulation of the HLN problem
is used as an input to the associated cost alloca-
tion problem. Note however, that the HLN op-
timization model becomes too large to handle
with 4-dimensional formulation even for net-
works with 20 nodes.
In this paper, we will revisit the above cost allo-
cation problem. The main contribution of this
paper is that it gives us the game theoretic cost
allocation solution, which is computationally
tractable for some larger HLN problems  20, 25
and even more nodes. Indeed, we will formu-
late yet another associated cooperative game, to
be referred to as the threshold game. We then
demonstrate that the core of the threshold game
can be characterized by  O n4 constraints.
This characterization of the core has the same
computational complexity as the characteriza-
tion in 13 and 14. Nevertheless, there are pro-
found differences. Namely, the players in the
threshold game are users  nodes rather than
pairs of users. Moreover, the definition of the
threshold game is based on the 3-dimensional
formulation of the HLN problem given in 7.
This in turn enables an efficient characteriza-
tion of the core of the threshold game which is
applicable for some larger HLN problems.
The plan of the reminder of the paper follows.
In Section 2, the HLN problem and some game
theoretic concepts are defined. In Section 3, we
formulate the threshold game associated with
the HLN problem. Section 4 provides the anal-
ysis of the core of the threshold game. In Sec-
tion 5, our findings and concluding remarks are
summarized.
2. Definitions and Preliminaries
For completeness, we re-state the 4- and 3-
dimensional formulations of the HLN problem
from 7. The decision variables are given as
follows. Let N be the set of nodes. The cost
of sending the unit of flow is assigned to ev-
ery link by cost matrix D   dkm Input ma-
trix F    fij contains the required amounts
of flow associated with every origin-destination
pair  i jVariable x1ijkmcaptures the fraction of
flow that goes from node i to node j via link
 k mwhich is not discounted. Variable x2ijkm is
the fraction of flow from i to j  via  k m that
is discounted. Parameter α , 0 α  1 is the
discount factor. Binary variable ykm is 1 if link
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st.
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x2ijkm   ykmQ
for all k m : k  m  2
x2ijkm  ykm fij







for all i j : i  j  4
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for all l i j : l  i j i  j  5
x1 x2   0 y-binary.  6
If the flow through a link  k m is discounted,
then itmust be greater than the thresholdQ  con-
straints  2. In the case when the link  k m is
not discounted, the variables x2ijkm are set to zero
 constraint  3. The complete flow fi j must
leave the origin i  constraint  4. Conserva-
tion of flow follows from constraint  5. Non-
negativity and integrality are ensured by con-
straints  6.
The complexity of this model is  O n4. Com-
putational studies 7 showed that the LP relax-
ation of this model is very tight. However, for
larger problems, the size of the problem be-
comes restrictive. Airline transportation and
telecommunication networks are often symmet-
ric. Hence, it made sense to consider a symmet-
ric case  dkm  dmk  fij  fji and also require





mk and ykm  ymkThis reduced the
number of variables by half, but the dimension
of the model remained  O n4.
It appears  see 7 that the 4-dimensional for-
mulation of the HLN model is restrictive with
respect to the size of the problem. For that rea-
son, we will also consider the 3-dimensional
formulation. Since we are interested in the
amount of flow that goes through each link
 k m, we will ignore the destination of the
flow. Disregarding the destinations we define
variables as follows:
x1ikm  non-discounted flow originated from
i through link  k m
x2ikm  discounted flow originated from i thro-
ugh link  k m,









































for all l i : l  i  10
x1 x2   0 y-binary.  11
Constraints  8  9 and  11 have the same role
as in the 4-dimensional case. Constraint  10
implies that the difference between the flow
coming into l and the flow going out of l is
equal to fil.
The loss of information in the 3-dimensional
case due to ignoring of destinations results with
the larger feasible set  i.e. the LP relaxation
is not as tight as in the 4-dimensional case.
On the other hand, the advantage is, that it can
handle larger problems. In 7, the authors pre-
sented several heuristic algorithms to solve the
HLN problem. Moreover, they performed ex-
tensive computational experiments on the CAB
 Civil Aeronautics Board benchmark data set.
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The efficiency of their formulations and heuris-
tic was demonstrated by obtaining the gaps be-
tween upper and lower bounds within few per-
cent.
In order to analyze the cost allocation problem
associated with the HLN problem, we need to
introduce the following game theoretic defini-
tions and notation. Let P  f1 2     ng be a
finite set of players, and let c : 2P  R with
c   0, be a characteristic function defined
over subsets of P referred to as coalitions. If
c P designates a cost that has to be shared by
all the players, then the pair  P;c is called a
 cost cooperative game, or simply a game. For
x  RjPj and S  P, let x S 
P
jS xjWe can
interpret x S as the part of the total cost paid by
the coalition S. A cost allocation vector x in a
game  P; c satisfies x P  c P, and the solu-
tion theory of cooperative games is concerned
with the selection of a reasonable subset of cost
allocation vectors.
Central to the solution theory of cooperative
games is the concept of solution referred to
as the core of a game. The core of a game
 P c consists of all vectors x  RjPj such that
x S  c S for all S  P, and x P  c P.
Observe that the core consists of all allocation
vectors x which provide no incentive for any
coalition to secede.
3. The Threshold Game
In this section, we will use a game theoretic ap-
proach to describe the cost allocation problem
in networks with threshold-based discounting.
Specifically, we will formulate associated co-
operative threshold game. The total cost of de-
livering the service through a hub-like network
is obtained from the best known objective func-
tion value to the 3-dimensional HLN problem
  7   11. The objective is to allocate this
cost among network users in a ’fair’ manner.
In order to define a threshold game we first have
to identify the players. The natural choice for
the set of players seem to be the set of all nodes,
namely P  N Observe that in 13 and 14 the
players were pairs of nodes. Since we use here
a 3-dimensional formulation of the HLN prob-
lem as input to our cost allocation problem, we
know for each link the amount of flow and the
source where it came from, but we do not know
the exact destination of the flow. Consequently,
the use of pairs of nodes for players is not ap-
plicable. Moreover, since we do not know the
destinations of flows in our solution, the above
choice of players  i.e. P  N is appropriate
only for symmetric problems.
Next, we will define the characteristic func-
tion c. For an empty set c   0. For
  T  N, we first define the cost of flow
generated by nodes in T through each link. Let
ckm T be the cost of flow that players in a coali-
tion T send through a link  k m in the optimal
 best known hub-like network. Note that we
assume here that the coalition T uses the same
links and costs as in a globally optimal solution.
The difference is that the cost of the above por-
tion of flow originated from nodes in T through
 k m, is discounted if and only if T itself gener-
ates enough traffic for the discount  the amount
exceeds the threshold. For each link  k m, we
call  N ckm the link game. For each T  N let
c T 
P
k m ckm T. Game  N cwill be
called the threshold discounting network game,
or, for short, the threshold game.
4. Core of the Threshold Game
Recall that the core consists of all cost alloca-
tion vectors that provide no incentive for any
coalition to secede. Specifically, each cost al-
location vector in the core of a threshold game
allocates to each coalition of players at most the
cost needed to provide service to that coalition.
Namely, there is no cross-subsidization. In this
Section we will show that the core of a thresh-
old game can be efficiently characterized.
Decomposition Theorems
Wewill demonstrate that the threshold game can
be decomposed into link games. Namely, in or-
der to analyze the core of the threshold game it
is sufficient to consider all corresponding link
games.
Theorem 1. For each link  k m, let xkm be a
point in the core C N ckm of the link game
 N ckm Then, x 
P
k m xkm is in the core
C N c of the threshold game  N c.
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Proof. Since xkm  C N ckm for all links
 k m xkm T  ckm T for all links  k m
and all coalitions T  N. This implies thatP
k m xkm T 
P
k m ckm T and then x T
 c T for all T  N  
Theorem 2. Let x be a cost allocation in
the threshold game. Define allocations for
the related link games as follows. For each
link  k m and a player i  T let the por-
tion of the cost covered by the player i be
xkm i  x i
ckmi
ci  If x is in the core C N c of
the threshold game then for each link  k m xkm
is in the core C N ckm of the related link game.
Proof. For any link  k m and any coalition














The above inequality holds since the assump-
tion x  C N c implies that x i  c i, for
all i  THence, for each link  k m xkm is in
C N ckm  
Corollary 1. In order to characterize the core
C N c of the threshold game  N c, it is suffi-
cient to characterize the cores C N ckm of link
games  N ckm where  k m are links in the
optimal hub-like network.
Characterization Theorems
In general, the main computational difficulty
with the core is that it is characterized with an
exponential number of constraints. Neverthe-
less, we will show that most of the core con-
straints for the core of each link game are re-
dundant. Namely, we will characterize the core
of the link game with  O n2 constraints.
Lemma 1. Consider a link game  N ckm. Let
TN be a coalition which generates enough
traffic to warrant the discount α on the traffic
through link  k m, and let xkm be the cost allo-
cation which satisfies the core constraints asso-
ciated with coalitions Nnfig for all i  N nT.
Then, for each i  NnT :
ckm Txkm T   ckm T	figxkm T	fig
Proof. Since the traffic generated by T is eligi-
ble for the discount on the link  k m, so is the
traffic generated by any superset of T . Then, by
definition of the characteristic function ckm for
each i  NnT we have:
ckm N ckm Nnfig
 ckm T 	 fig ckm T
 12
On the other hand,
ckm Nnfig xkm Nnfig   0
implies that
ckm Nnfig xkm N  xkm i   0
and then
xkm i   ckm N ckm Nnfig  13
Now from  12 and  13 it follows that
xkm i   ckm T 	 fig ckm T
which further implies that
ckm T xkm T   ckm T 	 fig x T 	 fig
 
Let f ikm be the amount of flow that the user i
generates through a link  k m. Let the collec-
tion S1  ffigj i  N and f ikm  Qg consist of
all single player coalitions which themselves do
not generate sufficient amount of traffic through
the link  k m to warrant the discountα and let
S2  fNnfig j i  Ng be the collection of all
coalitions that are missing only a single player.
Theorem 3. The core constraints associated
with coalitions in collections S1 and S2 com-
pletely determine the core of the link game
 N,ckm.
Proof. Assume that the core constraints asso-
ciated with all coalitions belonging to collec-
tions S1 and S2 are satisfied. Let the coalition
T 
 N be such that T  S1 or S2. We need to
consider two cases.
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 i If the total traffic generated by users in T
is not sufficient to enable the discount for the
traffic on the link  k m, then each user in T is





  ckm i xkm i   0
 ii If the total traffic generated by T is suffi-
cient for the discount on the link  k m, then
for any i  NnT , by the inductive application of
Lemma 4 it follows that:
ckm T xkm T
  ckm Nnfig xkm Nnfig   0
Hence, the core condition associated with the
coalition T is redundant.  
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the cost allocation
problem associated with the threshold-based
discounting  hub-likenetwork design problem.
The objective was to develop a procedure to al-
locate the cost in a fair manner using coopera-
tive game theory approach. By fair, we mean
that each subset of users should be charged a
share of the network cost which provide them
no incentive to seek services from another net-
work. There are no definite answers to the issue
of fairness, but the theory of cooperative games
proposes several solution concepts. To that end
we first formulated cooperative game referred
to as the threshold game.
Ourmodel emphasizes the users’ contribution to
economies of scale. We demonstrated that some
cost allocation solution s associated with these
games can be efficiently computed. Specifi-
cally, the threshold game  N c can be decom-
posed into n2 link games  N ckmand the core
of each link game can be characterized with 2n
linear constraints  T.3. Hence, the core of the
threshold game  N c can be characterized with
O n3 constraints.
The input to our cost allocation problem is the
best known solution to the symmetrical hub-like
network problem. Note that as inputwe can take
the solution to either 4- or 3-dimensional ver-
sion of the problem. Specifically, using these
inputs we can generate the relevant constraints
 T.3 for corresponding link games. Then, ev-
ery collection of feasible solutions to cores of
link games would give us a core point of the
threshold game  T.1, and all such collections
would give us the entire core of the threshold
game  T.2.
In summary, we developed a framework for the
efficient computation of some cost allocation
solutions in hub-like network. In those solu-
tions users are charged a fair share of the cost
with respect to their contribution to economies
of scale. Such a scheme gives the users incen-
tive to cooperate and exploit economies of scale
via participation in a threshold-based discount-
ing network.
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